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Abstract
This aims at better understanding the drivers behind the volume-outcome rela-
tionship found in many studies in the medical and health-economics literature.
In the first chapter I investigate the relationship between workload and choice
of treatment. Using detailed microdata on childbirth, I exploit a quasi-random
assignment of patients attempting to have a natural delivery to different ra-
tios of patients-to-midwives and compare their likelihood of changing delivery
method. I find that women who face a ratio higher than 1.33 are 34% more
likely to give birth by cesarean section (C-sections). This effect is larger for
patients who were already admitted with a higher risk of C-section, since pro-
vision of proper and timely care matters more for these patients. Because
C-sections are faster than vaginal deliveries, the medical team may find it
appealing to do more C-sections when time constrained. Using civil status
as a proxy for bargaining power -assuming single women are on average more
likely to be alone-, I find that only single patients are subjected to unnecessary
surgery.
The second chapter documents the existence of ‘learning-by-doing’ effects in
physicians’ performance. More specifically, I test whether cesarean-section
surgeons who have performed more procedures in the recent-past observe an
improvement in performance. By using data from the Italian health care sys-
tem, where patients are not allowed to choose a physician, I eliminate concerns
regarding possible bias from selective referral -a problem in previous studies.
Using four years of birth certificates data from one large hospital I find that, for
emergent cases, performing one additional procedure reduces the likelihood of
neonatal intensive care unit admission by nearly 1.2 percentage points (5.5%)
and of being born with a low Apgar Score by about 1.1 percentage points
(10%), all else equal.
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Chapter 1
Low Staffing in the Maternity
Ward: Keep Calm and Call the
Surgeon
1.1 Introduction
Over the last decades health care systems in developed countries have been
under constant pressure to reduce costs, despite facing an increasing demand
for health care services. In order to avoid a trade-off between cutting down on
costs and a negative impact on patients’ health outcomes, experts currently
point towards the reduction of waste as the best way to go.1 Among the
several sources of waste, two widely cited ones are the lack of adoption of
known best practices (e.g. effective preventive care) and overtreatment, that
is, the carrying out of treatments that cannot possibly improve the patients’
health (e.g. cases of physician induced demand). These two sources of waste
are particularly salient in maternity ward settings.
The role of midwives -as opposed to physicians- in assisting birth speaks to the
first point. Whereas relevant public health authorities have recently recognized
that midwife-led care during labor is safer for low-risk pregnancies2, the media
and midwifery colleges have long spoken of a “shortage of midwives”3, which
was also acknowledged by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 20094. At
the same time, cesarean sections (C-sections) rank high among greatly overused
1See, for example, Berwick and Hackbarth (2012).
2For example, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) updated its
guidelines in this direction in 2014.
3In a 2015 report, The Royal College of Midwives estimates that the UK “...needs 2,600
more midwives to be able to cope with the number of births the country is experiencing...”.
The Federal Association of Midwives of Spain (FAME) has as main objective to address
the shortage of midwives in the health care system. The president of the Italian Midwifery
Association recently stated that “...there is a shortage of midwives. Too few to guaranty
the proper level of care that other European Countries have”.
4?.
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interventions5, and governments and clinicians have expressed concern about
its potential negative impact on patients’ health6. Indeed, C-sections not only
cost more than vaginal deliveries, but they also imply higher risks for both
mother and infant7 and, according to a growing medical literature, are associ-
ated to lower long-term outcomes of children’s health8. In addition, because
vaginal delivery after a C-section (VBAC) is very unlikely9, one C-section sets
a path dependency for more C-sections in future births. There is also evidence
that women who follow a C-section are more likely to have less children10,
something that is particularly alarming in developed countries with already
low fertility rates.
In light of these concerns, a natural question is whether a situation of low
staffing can result in more unnecessary C-sections being performed. This can
happen either as a direct consequence of high workload -with midwives devot-
ing less time to each patient, which increases the probability of complications
that lead to surgery- or because physicians may find it optimal to induce some
patients towards a C-section independently of their health status. Since a
C-section takes less time than a vaginal birth -no need to wait for the appro-
priate dilation of the cervix-, midwives’ workload can be reduced by redirecting
patients to the operative theater.
This study causally tests whether patients follow a different delivery method
depending on the effective staff level in the maternity ward at the moment of
admission. It exploits a simple natural experiment: the majority of patients
follow the natural course of birth and only go to the hospital once labor has
already started and/or their water has broken (unlike, for example, scheduled
cesarean sections). The effective staff level (e.g. the staff per patient ratio)
observed by these patients at admission is orthogonal to their demographic
and health characteristics (and to their ex-ante probability of delivering by
C-section). The effective staff level at admission changes with the number of
patients who arrived before and the number of midwives present in the delivery
room, two variables that are unknown for the incoming patient.
The data for this project comes from a census of births from a large public
hospital in Italy for the period 2011-2014. Three features of this dataset make
it well suited for tackling the issue at hand. First, birth certificates have precise
information on delivery method, allowing the identification of scheduled and
unscheduled patients. Second, using patient’s ID, each certificate was merged
5While the international healthcare community considers an ideal rate of C-sections to
be between 10-15%, country average rates in Europe vary from as low as 15.6% in The
Netherlands to as high as 36.8% in Italy (OECD data 2012).
6WHO Statement on Caesarean Section Rates, WHO (2015).
7See Deneux-Tharaux et al. (2006); Gregory et al. (2012); Curtin et al. (2015).
8Infants born by C-section are not exposed to the maternal bacteria of the birth canal
and as a consequence have different intestinal bacteria, which can affect their immune system
and other important processes. For a meta-analysis of this literature see (Blustein and Liu,
2015).
9VBAC rate is only 8.3% in the US, and 12% in Italy.
10Norberg and Pantano (2016).
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with hospital administrative data containing the exact time of admission and
discharge. I use this information to compute the actual number of patients in
the delivery room at each point in time. Finally, this is complemented with
data on the number of midwives scheduled by month, day of the week and
shift.
Results suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between effective mid-
wifery staff and delivery method: a newly admitted patient who faces a ratio
of patients-to-midwives higher than 1.33 is 34% more likely to give birth by
C-section. This means that, for first-time mothers, about 1.2 p.p. (or 5.7%)
of all C-sections (both scheduled and unscheduled) are the consequence of low
midwifery staffing.
The second part of the analysis looks at possible mechanisms behind this
change in delivery method. One possibility is that, in situations with a high
ratio of patients-to-midwives, the time dedicated to each patient is lower and
the quality of care inappropriate, eventually resulting in the need for C-section.
If that is true, then one should see patients with marginally lower health being
more affected. In order to test this hypothesis, two types of patients are
compared: a low-health type, formed by those patients who had an emergency
visit during their pregnancy or whose babies had an extreme weight at birth,
and a high-health type, with all the remaining patients. Indeed, the gap
between the probability of having a C-section between a low-health and a
high-health patient widens with a higher workload.
Another factor that can explain the rise in C-sections alongside with work-
load is the presence of physician induced demand (PID). Because C-sections
are faster than vaginal births, when faced with time constraints, physicians
may decide to put some patients through surgery -without a medical necessity
for it-, reducing the midwives’ workload. Within the agency discrimination
framework, physicians will choose to practice an unnecessary surgery on pa-
tients with lower bargaining power. This study tests for the presence of agency
by comparing single women and non-single women, assuming that single pa-
tients are -on average- more likely to be alone in the delivery room. In those
cases, the physician will need less effort in convincing the patient to have a
C-section. Indeed, the data shows that the gap in the probability of delivering
by C-section between these two groups is statistically significant only for high
ratios of patients-to-midwives. On the other hand, I find that married and
low-risk patients are between 24% and 35% more likely of not attaining skin-
to-skin contact with their newborn when the number of patients per midwife
is high. This provides more evidence that, by performing more C-sections,
physicians are avoiding some bad outcomes.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it adds to exist-
ing work on the effect of staff ratios on health outcomes. Previous studies find
none or very small effects when using census discharge data (Evans and Kim,
2006; Cook et al., 2012), and a negative impact of crowding on health when
focusing on patients in the Emergency Department (ED) (de Araujo et al.,
10 Gabriel Alejandro Facchini Palma Chapter 1
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2013). This difference across areas makes sense given the particular time con-
strains of patients in the ED. The maternity wards lay somewhere in between
these two. However, there is no study looking at the effect of staff ratio in
maternity wards using a casual approach. The one that comes closest to this
is Balakrishnan and Soderstrom (2000), using data from 225,473 maternity
admissions at 30 hospitals in the state of Washington. They identify crowded
days using a percentile cut-off from the distribution of patients’ admissions
for each hospital-year combination and use the rate of C-sections as outcome.
They find a positive and significant correlation between the two, but only for
those pregnancies that are classified as at-risk of C-section. A shortcoming of
this paper is that they cannot differentiate between scheduled and unsched-
uled patients in their data, raising concerns about causal relationships. It
could be the case that days with more patients are those with more planned
C-sections, without necessarily having any effect on patients’ health outcomes.
I contribute to this literature by causally estimating the effect of low staffing
ratios on delivery method.
Second, there is a vast number of empirical studies that look at different causes
for the exceedingly high levels of C-sections. Starting from the paper by Gruber
and Owings (1996) where they use physician’s income drop as a trigger for
more C-sections, to other incentives like relative prices between C-sections and
vaginal deliveries (Gruber et al., 1999; Alexander et al., 2013; Allin et al., 2015),
defensive medicine (Keeler and Brodie, 1993; Lawthers et al., 1992; Currie and
MacLeod, 2008; Dranove and Watanabe, 2009), and physician’s scheduling
convenience (Lefe`vre, 2014).11 I provide evidence of a new mechanism behind
this phenomena: work overload provides incentives for physicians to induce
C-sections.
Third, this study also relates to the literature that empirically tests possible
mechanisms behind PID. Two recent papers use information asymmetry vari-
ations in the maternity ward set up. Grytten et al. (2011) compare expert
and non-expert patients and conclude that a model of statistical discrimina-
tion (expert patients are better at communicating with the physician) explains
their results better than one of agency discrimination (physician influences the
diagnosis and treatment for non-expert patients). On the contrary, Johnson
and Rehavi (2016) find evidence that physicians are more likely to exploit
the information asymmetry when it is profitable. They do so by comparing
physician patients with non-physician patients, in settings with and without
financial incentives to perform C-sections. I add to this body of work by using
a different approach to test for bargaining power: whether the mother is alone
in the delivery room.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
clinical and institutional setting. Section 3 discusses the identification strategy
followed and describes the data. Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5
concludes.
11For an extensive review of this literature see Allin et al. (2015).
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1.2 Clinical and Institutional Setting
Maternity wards receive two types of patients: scheduled and unscheduled.
The former includes patients admitted for an elective C-section and those
who will be induced.12 For patients following an elective C-sections the date
of delivery is set in advance, and there is no possibility for changing delivery
method (unless the mother goes into labor before). These pregnancies typically
present some health condition that constitute a risk for the mother and/or
the baby if delivered vaginally. Similarly, induced patients already know in
advance the date they will be induced but, although they will attempt a vaginal
delivery, the physician may still decide to change delivery method on the way
if considered necessary.
The remaining patients -those attempting to follow the natural course of labor
and vaginal delivery- are the main focus of this study. For these patients the
process starts with frequent contractions and/or because they believe their
water has broken (spontaneous onset of labor). Once the mother arrives to
the hospital she is evaluated and if in active labor, she is admitted to the
delivery room and assigned a gynecologist and a midwife. If everything goes
as planned and the patient is able to have a vaginal delivery, the midwife will be
the one helping her throughout the whole process. Nevertheless, during labor
there are several medical conditions that can emerge and complicate a vaginal
birth, putting in danger the health of the infant and/or the mother. Under
these circumstances, the midwife and gynecologist may decide to recommend
a C-section instead.
More importantly, the actual presence of some of these medical conditions
depends heavily on the subjective opinion of the gynecologist.13 This gray
area -or asymmetry of information- on when a C-section is necessary gives the
gynecologist more room to suggest the patient to have a surgery -even when
not medically needed.
The maternity unit analyzed in this paper is part of one large teaching hos-
pital in Italy. The staff working in the delivery room are paid a fixed salary,
meaning they have no personal financial incentive to recommend any partic-
ular treatment. On the other hand, hospitals are reimbursed depending on a
DRG (Diagnosed-related group) tariff system, which in general gives a higher
reward for a C-section than a vaginal delivery.14
12Most inducements are performed on pregnancies that have past their due date and still
haven’t started labor.
13Two of these more ‘subjective’ conditions are dystocia (abnormally slow labor) and fetal
distress
14For a deeper discussion on the Italian Health System please see Francese et al. (2014).
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1.3 Empirical Methodology
1.3.1 A natural experiment
An ideal experiment to test for an effect of low-staffing in the maternity ward on
patients’ delivery method would imply assigning parturient women randomly
between two different hospital types: a first one with already a large number
of patients and a second type, identical to the first, but with few patients and
hence ready to focus entirely on the coming patient. For obvious reasons this
is not possible to implement in practice.
This paper focuses on patients who attempt vaginal delivery, and uses the
exogenous variability in the number of patients and midwives present at ad-
mission to causally identify the impact of low staffing on delivery method.
For the majority of births, the time of arrival is unknown to the hospital be-
forehand. In the same way, the level of capacity utilization of the maternity
ward in a given point in time is unknown for future patients until they reach
the hospital. For this sample of patients, their pre-admission probability of
developing a complication and needing C-section is orthogonal to the level of
crowding at the hospital.
The study sample includes all births that, up to the point of arriving to the
hospital, followed the “natural” course of pregnancy and labor. This means
leaving out all scheduled deliveries where the physician decided, together with
the patient, the date when the birth should take place. This type of patients
are those who had an elective C-section or who were pharmaceutically induced
to start labor.15
The left column of Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of admissions by hour
of the day and day of the week. The right column does the same for births.
Both are estimated for scheduled and unscheduled patients, for comparative
purposes. We can immediately see that admissions of scheduled patients are
concentrated in the afternoon, while births start at 9 a.m. and become less
and less frequent as the day goes by. Instead, both admissions and births
for unscheduled patients are very close to a uniform distribution across the
day. When looking at the distribution by days of the week, again unscheduled
patients are randomly distributed while scheduled patients are less common
to be admitted on Saturdays, and less likely to have surgery on Sundays and
Saturdays.
15For more evidence supporting the criteria for selecting the working sample see Ap-
pendix A.1.
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Figure 1.1 – Distribution of admissions and births.
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1.3.2 Data
Previous studies looking at newborns’ health tend to use anonymous birth
certificates since they are publicly available for many countries and for long
periods of time. Nevertheless these datasets commonly lack information on
key variables needed for a rigorous study of staffing levels, namely the exact
date and time of admission of patients (demand side) and the number of staff
available (supply side), for each hospital.
This study utilizes data from the Maternity Department of the Azienda Os-
pedaliero Universitaria Careggi (AOUC) for the years 2011 through 2014. This
is the biggest hospital in the Province of Florence with more than 3,000 de-
liveries per year. The primary databases used are two: (i) birth certificates16;
and (ii) hospital admissions17. Birth certificates constitute a census of all
births that took place in the hospital in this period. It contains information
on mother characteristics (e.g. community of residence, education, civil status,
16Certificato di assistenza al parto (CEDAP).
17Scheda di Dimissione Ospedaliera (SDO).
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age, previous deliveries, etc.), pregnancy characteristics (e.g. weeks of gesta-
tion, controls, assisted reproduction, etc.) and birth characteristics (e.g. time
of birth, type of labor, attendant, place, weight of the baby etc.). The adminis-
trative hospital admission data provides information on the time of admission
and time of discharge for each patient. Using unique mother-pregnancy iden-
tifiers, both databases can be merged together.
The aforementioned data on patients is complemented with information on the
level of staff scheduled to be present at each month, day of the week and shift
in the delivery room. Note that this is not the effective level of staff present at
each point in time but the schedule that the personnel should follow. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that deviations from planned levels are rare, even because
the hospital calls in someone else when an employee misses her shift.
However, the richness of this dataset comes at a cost: because the information
available corresponds only to one hospital in a four year period the sample
size is relatively small. Furthermore, due to the path dependence of treatment
in second and higher order births, this study focuses on first-time mothers.
There were approximately 5,240 singleton births at this hospital in the sample
period. From this, about 870 observations are plural births and/or delivered by
urgent C-section which will not be taken into account in the analysis because
of their particular characteristics and handling within the hospital. Further
restricting the sample to non-induced planned-vaginal deliveries, the number of
observations goes down to around 2,685. Finally, after dropping observations
with missing time of admission, maternal age, education, birth order, weight
and prenatal visits, the number of observations in the working sample is about
2,600. The models described below are fitted to this sample.
Table 1.1 summarizes the variables used in the analysis. The first column
corresponds to the whole sample. Most of the patients who attempt a vaginal
delivery succeeded. Only about 12% had an in-labor C-section. Patients are
on average 31 years old, only 36% has a university degree, and 44% are single.
There are few cases with bad outcomes: only 4.6% have a 5-minute APGAR
score below 9, and about 5% are born prematurely or weighting less than 2,500
grams. Columns 2 and 3 report statistics for patients with a low and high ex-
ante risk of C-section respectively. Columns 4 and 5 do the same by civil
status. By construction, patients with high-risk are more likely to give birth
by C-section, to use the neonatal intensive care unit, and to have an APGAR
score below 9. They are also more likely to be single and less likely to have
a university degree. Finally, single patients are less likely to have a university
degree and more likely to delivery by C-section, although other outcomes are
similar to the married subsample.
1.3.3 An exogenous measure of midwives’ workload
A good measure of effective staff contains information on both the number
of patients and personnel. For this case study I use the ratio between the
Chapter 1 Gabriel Alejandro Facchini Palma 15
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number of patients and the number of midwives in the delivery room.18 The
richness of the data at hand allows to construct a very precise measure of the
number of parturient women in the maternity ward at any point in time and
to differentiate between those waiting to give birth and those in postpartum.
But there are yet two decisions to be taken regarding the moment at which
this ratio is calculated, and the type of patients to include in the numerator.
On the former, because patients stay on average 7 hours in the delivery room
between admission and birth, it is not obvious at what time to measure the
level of staffing. The two most viable options are at the time of admission
and at the time of delivery. The last one has the advantage of measuring
staff when needed the most, meaning, when the mother needs help to give
birth. The problem with this option is that, given that physicians can rush
a delivery (e.g. by doing a C-section), the level of staffing at time of birth
can be endogenously determined. On the other hand, even though the level
of staffing at time of admission can be relatively less relevant, it is indeed an
exogenous shock. For these reasons I will use the ratio of patients to midwives
calculated at the time of admission of each patient.19
On the second issue, it is important to clarify which patients are included
in this measure of staffing. The first option would be to include all patients
(regardless of whether they are scheduled or induced). One could think that,
because the time of the admitted patient is random, there is no risk of endo-
geneity here. Nevertheless, since the outcome of interest is the probability of
C-section, counting elective C-sections in the measure of staffing would make
it biased. Note that when there are more elective C-sections there are also
more gynecologists ready to perform them. Incorporating elective C-sections
in the numerator would not only include a demand side but also a change in
the supply of physicians who can perform C-sections. Hence this study in-
cludes in the numerator all patients but those already scheduled to give birth
by C-section.20 Instead, the number of scheduled C-sections is included in the
regression as control (see econometric specification below).
More specifically, the workload observed by patient i at admission time t is
defined as
18One drawback of this measure is that it constraints the coefficient of interest due to the
simultaneous variations in numerator and denominator. The fact that my preferred model
specification uses fixed effects by shift and day-of-the-week means that all the variation used
for the estimation comes solely from fluctuations in the numerator, alleviating this issue.
Furthermore, Appendix A.2 repeats the main analysis using solely the number of patients
as the covariate of interest, and results are qualitatively the same. In light of these results,
in the main paper I will use the ratio of patients-to-midwives since it provides an advantage
with regard to external validity (findings become less dependent on the size of the hospital
studied).
19In the following section I perform several robustness check measuring staff levels at
different points in time during a patients stay, and discuss the results.
20Note that this is not the same sample as the study sample because it also includes
induced deliveries. Those are not at risk of contaminating the measure because they will
still attempt a vaginal delivery, and will need a midwife to help them.
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Rit =
PV Bit
MWit
(1.1)
where PVB is the number of patients waiting to attempt a vaginal birth, and
MW is the number of midwives scheduled to be present in the delivery room.
Table 1.2 shows the mean number of midwives and patients (with its standard
deviation) in the delivery room by day of the week and shift of admission.
The number of midwives is higher during the morning shift (5), and lower at
nights and Sundays (3). On the other hand, the average number of patients
is virtually the same across days of the week and shifts, with a slightly lower
level on Sundays.21
Table 1.2 – Number of midwives and patients by day of the week and shift.
Day Shift Midwives Patients§
(mean) (sd) (mean) (sd)
Weekdays
Morning (7am - 1pm) 5 0 7.31 2.81
Afternoon (1pm - 7pm 4 0 7.48 2.89
Night (7pm - 7am) 3 0 7.32 2.86
Saturdays
Morning (7am - 1pm) 4 0 7.53 2.63
Afternoon (1pm - 7pm 4 0 7.41 2.70
Night (7pm - 7am) 3 0 7.26 2.71
Sundays
Morning (7am - 1pm) 3 0 7.09 2.73
Afternoon (1pm - 7pm) 3 0 7.08 2.76
Night (7pm - 7am) 3 0 6.94 2.68
§ Number of patients waiting who attempt to have a vaginal birth.
Table 1.3 shows the distribution of the ratio of patients to midwives for the
whole sample and then disaggregated by shift of admission. The ratio is uni-
modal and slightly skewed to the right.22 At the median, there are 2 patients
for every midwife in the delivery room. The 25th and 75th percentiles are 30%
(below) and 34% (above) the median, respectively. Note that shifts later in
the day have higher values of the ratio, meaning, more crowding. Remember
that the distribution of patients is rather uniform across the day, hence this
upward shift in the ratio comes exclusively from a lower supply (less midwives
present).23 The bottom rows of the Table 1.3 show the cutoff values for the
lowest and highest quintiles (and by construction for the three middle quintiles
altogether). The lowest quintile will be considered a case with no crowding,
with a mean of 1 patient per midwife. The middle quintiles have a mean ratio
21The difference with Sunday is due to the fact that there are less induced births.
22See Figure A.4 for a graphic representation of the density distribution of the ratio by
shift.
23In Figure A.5 one can see how the average ratio of patients to midwives by hour of
admission shows a discrete jump up with each change in shift due to one less midwife being
present.
18 Gabriel Alejandro Facchini Palma Chapter 1
Essays in Health Economics
of 1.9, somewhat crowded. The highest ratio, with a mean of 3.2 patients per
midwife, will be referred to as highly crowded or chaos.
Table 1.3 – Descriptive statistics for ratio of patients to midwives by shift of
admission.
All Morning Afternoon Night
(7am - 1pm) (1pm - 7pm) (7pm - 7am)
p1 0.60 0.40 0.50 0.67
p5 0.80 0.75 0.75 1.00
p25 1.40 1.20 1.50 1.67
p50 2.00 1.50 1.75 2.33
p75 2.67 2.00 2.33 3.00
p95 3.67 3.00 3.25 4.00
p99 4.50 4.00 4.50 4.67
mean 2.06 1.60 1.91 2.36
sd 0.86 0.70 0.74 0.88
<20th Percentile 1.33
>80th Percentile 2.67
Obs. 2,613 636 641 1,336
1.3.4 Econometric specification
The first part of the analysis estimates OLS regressions of a binary indicator
for C-section on the treatment variable along with demographic and clinical
controls. A simple reduced-form linear probability model of the following type
is used:24
yit = α + β Rit + θXit + γt csit + dowXshiftt + yeart +montht + it (1.2)
where yit is a dummy variable indicating whether birth i admitted at time t
had an in-labor C-section, and Rit is the ratio of patients-to-midwives observed
at admission as explained above. Xit contains individual-level control variables
of mother and pregnancy characteristics25. To further control for supply side
24A probit model was also estimated assuming a normal distribution of the error term
and results are virtually the same (See Table A.6).
25These include: a dummy for whether the mother is above 34 years old, a dummy for
whether the mother has a university degree, a dummy for whether this is her first pregnancy,
a dummy for whether the infant is a male, a dummy for whether is a pre-term birth (below
37 weeks of gestation), a dummy for whether the baby is born with low weight (less than
2,500 grams), and a dummy for whether the mother had at least one emergency check up
during pregnancy.
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changes in physicians availability, I include the number of scheduled C-sections
that took place while the indexed patient was in the delivery room (cs). Since
most supply side changes in the maternity ward take place between shifts and
days, in the most demanding specification I also add fixed effects for day-of-
the-week (dow) times shift.26 To control for seasonal and secular variation
in outcomes, I also include monthly and yearly dummy variables. β is the
coefficient of interest. As discussed above, if physicians are more likely to
perform a C-section when the ratio of patients to midwives is high, then β
should be positive.
Two models are estimated for the probability of delivering by C-section. First,
I include the ratio of patients-to-midwives directly in the model. Because there
can be non linear effects between staffing and delivery method, for the second
model I split the sample in three categories based on the ratio of patients-to-
midwives: low, medium, and high (or chaos). All those observations with a
ratio below the 20th percentile are in the first group. These are cases of no
crowding, or very low ratio of patients to midwives. The second group includes
those observations between the 20th and 80th percentiles, and are categorized
as cases with some crowding. Finally, the last group consists of all those above
the 80th percentile. These are situations of very high ratios of patients to
midwives. The cut offs for these groups are reported in the bottom of Table 1.3.
In these models, the lowest quintile (low staffing) is considered the reference
group.27 Table A.4 shows the coefficients of a regression of each of the pre-
treatment controls on the ratio of patients-to-midwives. The lack of statistical
significance for all cases provides support to the exogeneity assumption of my
measure of staffing. Furthermore, for the non-linear specification, Table A.5
shows that the mean of the pre-treatment characteristics are not statistically
different across the three groups of staffing (low, medium and high). Again,
this emphasizes the strength of the quasi-natural experiment.
The last part of the analysis aims at understanding the mechanisms through
which physicians decide to recommend some patients to change delivery method.
Two hypothesis are tested. First, it could be the case that high values of the
ratio of patients to midwives results in less midwifery time available for each
patient. Under this scenario, patients who were admitted with an already
higher risk of C-section (and that need more care) will be the most affected. At
higher ratios, the probability of C-section should rise faster for this group than
for other patients -all else constant- due to their pre-treatment lower health.
Patients with a higher risk are identified as those with extreme birthweight
(below 2,500 grams or above 4,000 grams) or with at least one emergency visit
to the hospital during pregnancy.
26This means that all the variation in this specification comes from within same day of
the week and shift. For example, I would be comparing a mother who arrived on a Tuesday
afternoon shift and finds many patients waiting with another woman arriving a different
Tuesday afternoon but who observes few patients waiting.
27See Appendix A.3 for a more detailed discussion on model selection, where models of
different polynomial degrees and categorical definitions of workload are tested.
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The second hypothesis has to do with agency discrimination. When resources
are constrained, e.g. high workload, physicians may consider it is optimal
to shift some patients to the operative theater for a C-section. This would
reduce the workload on midwives by reducing the number of patients waiting
in the delivery room. Because patients are heterogenous, physicians will find
it easier to offer this treatment to some patients more than others. This paper
uses the patient’s civil status as a proxy to whether she is alone in the delivery
room.28 The assumption here is that, on average, single women are more likely
to be alone in the delivery room.29 In those cases, the physician only needs to
convince one person about the change in procedure -not to mention the patient
is in labor and under stress, which makes harder to analyze the pros and cons
of each alternative-.
To test whether physicians’ treatment covaries with the patients’ characteris-
tics above mentioned, I estimate the following regression:
yit = α+β1 Rit+β2 Rit×Dit+β3 Dit+θXit+γt csit+dowXshiftt+yeart+montht+it
(1.3)
where Dit is either one of two variables: an indicator for whether the patient
has a high-risk of C-section, or whether she is single. The remaining variables
are defined as in Eq. (1.2), adding civil status as a control. I expect high-risk
and single patients to be more affected by a high ratio of patients, hence, a
positive β2 in both cases.
1.4 Results
Table 1.4 presents the results of Eq. (1.2). Starting from a regression with only
the covariate of interest and fixed effects for year, month and day of the week
in the first column, each remaining column sequentially adds more controls.
The second column adds controls for mother and pregnancy characteristics, the
third adds the number of scheduled C-sections taking place during patient’s
labor, the fourth column includes hour of admission fixed effects, while the
last one instead uses shift-of-admission interacted with day-of-the-week fixed
effects. This last model is the preferred one since it accounts for possible sup-
ply changes in the ward that occur between shifts and days. To save space,
only the coefficients of treatment are included, but results for other covariates
are comparable to previous studies.30 The numbers in parentheses in the table
are standard errors. The average value of each dependent variable is included
at the bottom of each panel to help understand whether coefficients are eco-
nomically important. For all remaining estimations in this paper I will use the
specification model in column (5).
28This variable is constructed only with married and single women. For the sake of clarity,
all women outside these two categories (divorced, separated and widows) are not considered.
29For a single woman in Tuscany, the odds of being alone in the delivery room are 1.25
times larger than the odds for a married woman being alone ((alias?)).
30Full regressions are available upon request.
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Table 1.4 – Effect of effective staffing on the Probability of C-section
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel (A)
Ratio patients 0.0019 0.0038 0.0046 0.0007 0.0004
to midwives (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0083) (0.0085)
Panel (B)
20-80th Percentile 0.0432*** 0.0441*** 0.0452*** 0.0410*** 0.0408***
(0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0156)
>80th Percentile 0.0193 0.0238 0.0261 0.0187 0.0197
(0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0210) (0.0213)
Observations 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613
Mean dep. 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119
Time FE X X X X X
Controls X X X X
Other patients X X X
Hour FE X
Shift*dayofweek FE X
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Reported coefficients are average marginal effects.
Panel (A) of the table reports results for the ratio of patients-to-midwives as
a continuous variable, and Panel (B) reports results using a dummy variables
for different levels of workload in order to test for non-linearities. Notice that
coefficients across columns (models) only change in the third decimal. This
is a good sign of exogeneity of the ratio of patients-to-midwives. Although
the coefficient for the linear specification is not statistically significant, in the
second panel the probability of having a C-section is about 4 p.p. (34%) higher
for those who face a ratio of patients-to-midwives in the middle of the distri-
bution compared to those in the reference group. For those patients arriving
when the ratio of patients-to-midwives is very high (last quintile), there is no
statistically significant effect on the probability of C-section. This may be due
to some capacity constraints on the operative theater when workload is at its
highest levels.
This effect would imply a 5.7% (or 1.2 p.p.) rise in total C-sections (scheduled
and unscheduled), which is economically important and reasonable when com-
pared with previous studies looking at all C-sections and changes in monetary
compensation. Allin et al. (2015) find that doubling the compensation for a
C-section relative to a vaginal delivery increases the likelihood that a physi-
cian opts for the former by just more than 5 p.p., all else equal. Gruber et al.
(1999) suggests that cesarean delivery rates would rise by 3.9% in response to
each $100 increase in the compensation received for a C-section, all else equal.
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Table A.7 presents results of the effect according to whether the patient arrived
in a weekday or weekend, and by shift of admission. The estimations are
very imprecise due to the few number of observations in each cell, and render
all differences insignificant. Nevertheless point estimates are slightly higher
in weekends, as well as for admissions during the morning shift. Table A.8
shows results for a robustness check where I measure effective staff level at
different points in time between a patient’s admission and delivery. The effect
of congestion disappears the further away from admission it is measured, which
can be a result of the endogeneity issue mentioned before: physicians can
adjust the timing of births. Finally, Table A.9 presents results for a placebo
test where workload is measured 24 hours after admission (instead at admission
as before). As expected, for all different specifications, the placebo is always
statistically and clinically insignificant.
1.4.1 How do physicians choose which patients to send
to the operative theater?
This part of the study digs deeper into the mechanisms behind the effect of
staffing on the rate of C-sections. As mentioned before, two hypothesis are
tested. First, low-staffing means there is less midwifery-time available for each
patient, which may result in more patients needing C-section due to the lack of
proper care. This effect should be higher for those patients who were admitted
with an already higher risk of C-section. Secondly, physicians and midwives
may actively decide to perform a C-section on some patients in moments of
low-staffing in order to reduce the number of patients in the delivery room. In
this case I expect patients with lower bargaining power -which I proxy by civil
status- receiving relatively more unnecessary treatment.
Table 1.5 reports the average marginal effects obtained for each group from es-
timating Eq. (1.3). As expected, a higher number of patients per midwife rises
the probability of C-section more for single patients but not for married ones.
Points estimates suggest that high-risk patients are more affected by workload
than low-risk patients, although the only statistically significant coefficient is
for this group. However estimates are very imprecise.
Another way to look at it is by comparing the average marginal effects of
being high-risk and single, across the different levels of the ratio of patients-
to-midwives. This can be seen in Figures 1.2a and 1.2b respectively. Note that
the effect of staffing, in both cases, is not statistically significant when the ratio
is low. For the comparison based on ex-ante risk, the point estimate for the
difference in the probability of C-section between the two groups gets higher
with workload -albeit not statistically significant-. This is reasonable since the
marginal benefit from midwives’ attention is higher for high-risk patients.
Instead, for the case of married vs. single mothers, the difference is statistically
significant only for those in the middle of the distribution, but goes down again
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Table 1.5 – Effect of effective staffing on the Probability of C-section
Low-risk High-risk Married Single
20-80th Percentile 0.0330* 0.0587 0.0270 0.0516**
(0.0175) (0.0368) (0.0202) (0.0247)
>80th Percentile 0.0023 0.0755 0.0125 0.0182
(0.0229) (0.0557) (0.0265) (0.0332)
Observations 2,118 495 1,300 1,028
Mean 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.13
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p <
0.1. Reported coefficients are average marginal effects from a regres-
sion of the probability of C-section on the interaction of treatment, a
variable for being high risk and a variable for being single. The number
of observations when using marital status is slightly smaller because
the variable is missing for 11% of the working sample.
when workload is high. At high levels of workload it is more likely that capacity
constraints in the operative theater emerge as well. These “extra” C-sections
only based on midwives’ workload and not due to patients’ health-status should
go down during the busiest times.
1.4.2 The effect on other interventions and morbidity
outcomes
The estimates above demonstrate that, when the ratio of patients-to-midwives
is high, physicians send some patients to the operative theater to have a C-
section. These patients are typically those with a higher-risk of needing a
C-section, or single women. The question that emerges then is: are physicians
using their high bargaining power to transfer some patients so that midwives
can provide better care for the remaining patients? In order to test this,
I estimate Eq. (1.3) again but now the outcome variable is one of the five
indicators of morbidity and interventions mentioned before. If a high ratio
lowers the quality of care, then those type of patients who are not likely to be
sent to the operative theater would be the ones more affected by it.
In the economics literature the most commonly studied health outcomes for
births are: weight, fetal mortality and maternal mortality. Nevertheless both
maternal and fetal deaths are extremely rare events (4 per 100,000 births and
2.7 per 1,000 births respectively for Italy). In the case of weight-at-birth,
because treatment here is defined at the moment of admission to the hospital,
it is considered a pre-defined outcome (not affected by treatment).31
31In fact weight at birth is one of the variables used to assess the balancing of the sample
between treatment and control groups.
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Figure 1.2 – Difference in the effect of staffing on the probability of C-section
by type of patient
(a) By pre-admission risk
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Note: Dots are the average marginal effect of whether the patient is high-risk (a) or
single (b). Bars are 90% confidence intervals.
The restricted-use version of the birth certificates at hand contain, however,
some other measures of health and registers of medical interventions that are
associated with health outcomes. The measures that occur in at least 1%
of births are: having an operative birth32, length-of-stay after birth (LOS),
whether the newborn was transferred to a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU),
no skin-to-skin contact, lack of exclusive breastfeeding, and whether the new-
born had an APGAR score33 below 9. A higher probability of needing NICU,
having an operative birth34 or a longer time in the hospital during crowded
times can be signals of lower quality. Similarly, if human resources are scarce,
physicians may decide to skip some steps of the service considered important
but not essential. For example, they may decide that helping the newly mother
achieve skin-to-skin contact with her newborn is not as important as helping
another woman in labor to deliver. The same reasoning applies for not giving
exclusive breast-feeding.
While it is clear why a higher probability of going to NICU, having a low
APGAR score, or staying longer in the hospital are not desirable, there are
also compelling arguments regarding the importance of the remaining set of
outcomes. In a systematic review, Ip et al. (2007) finds that breastfeeding is
associated with both decreased risk of many early-life diseases and conditions
as well as with health benefits to women35. At the same time, skin-to-skin
32Operative vaginal delivery refers to a delivery in which the physician uses forceps or a
vacuum device to assist the mother in transitioning the fetus to extra-uterine life.
33The Apgar score is a method used to quickly summarize the health of newborn children.
The Apgar scale is determined by evaluating the newborn baby on five simple criteria on a
scale from zero to two, then summing up the five values thus obtained. The resulting Apgar
score ranges from zero to 10.
34A higher likelihood for operative birth has been linked to scarce or absent midwifery
care and the presence of obstetrician or physicians instead (Hatem et al. (2008)).
35“Breastfeeding and Maternal and Infant Health Outcomes in Developed Countries”,
AHRQ Publication No. 07-E007, April 2007.
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contact has been shown to increase the probability and length of exclusive
breastfeeding (Moore et al., 2007), as well as to substantially reduce neonatal
mortality amongst preterm babies in hospital(Lawn et al., 2010). In the case
of operative births, even though it is still widely used, this delivery method
is becoming less popular due to some evidence showing it increases maternal
morbidity and can cause significant fetal morbidity (Ali and Norwitz, 2009;
Murphy et al., 2011; Towner et al., 1999).
Table 1.6 displays the average marginal effects for each of the four groups of
women (high and low risk, married and single), and for the five outcomes above
mentioned. Estimates are quite imprecise given the small sample size and the
rarity of these morbidities. However, there is a statistically significant, large
and positive effect of the high ratios of patients-to-midwives on the probability
of not achieving skin-to-skin contact with the infant. Furthermore, this effect is
only present for married patients, who are not more likely to get surgery when
workload rises. These patients are between 24% and 35% more likely to not
attain skin-to-skin contact with their newborn when the number of patients
per midwife is higher. This provides further evidence of the hypothesis that
physicians send some patients to the operative theater in order to avoid other
negative health outcomes.
1.4.3 Other possible channels?
Beyond the mechanisms mentioned in the previous section, there are, at least,
two more channels that can explain the rise in C-sections along with the rise
of the ratio of patients-to-midwives. The first and most obvious option is
that patients who are admitted in low and high staffing times are different.
Nevertheless, all tests performed in this study and previous research support
the idea that, for those patients attempting a vaginal delivery, their time of
arrival to the hospital is randomly distributed across the day and week.
The other possible explanation is that those type of patients who get these ‘ex-
tra’ C-sections actually have a preference for this delivery method. However,
because the focus is exclusively on in-labor C-sections, the above estimates
correspond to women who have already agreed on attempting a ‘natural’ vagi-
nal delivery. Hence the effect is more likely to arise from decisions made in
the delivery room regarding when to stop labor and change treatment, than
from maternal preferences for C-sections. Nevertheless, because data comes
from a public hospital, patients may be denied an elective C-section -even
when preferred- if there is no medical reason for it. Hence it is not possible to
totally rule out that some demographic groups may be more inclined towards
having a C-section and physicians internalize this when deciding which patient
to send to surgery.
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1.4.4 Can these ‘extra’ C-sections be avoided?
Results above suggest that physicians do more surgeries when staffing is low.
First-time mothers facing a ratio of patients-to-midwives between 1.33 and
2.66 are 4 p.p. (or 34%) more likely to have an in-labor C-section. A policy
to eliminate overcrowding from maternity wards would have a very significant
effect on the already high levels of C-sections seen in Italy. How to do that is
not clear.
Considering only the hospital used in the analysis, in the absence of crowding,
the “extra costs” for the public health system are of about e17,700 a year.36
This is not enough to hire the necessary number of midwives to avoid low-
staffing situations. However, one should keep in mind that this analysis is
not complete, since one should include other costs like the drop in skin-to-
skin contact when staffing is low, or the other non-financial costs of C-sections
mentioned in the introduction of this study.
Another possible policy is to concentrate maternity wards in fewer but big-
ger units and benefit from the economies of scale emerging. The larger the
population a hospital serves, the lower the coefficient of variation of demand,
and hence the higher the occupancy rate (Long and Feldstein, 1967). For the
hospital under study this may not really be a suitable alternative since it is
already a large maternity ward and the only one in the city.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper I use a natural experiment set up and detailed data on births
to estimate the impact of staffing on physician’s treatment decisions. More
specifically, I investigate whether different levels of midwifery effective staffing
(patients-to-midwives) influence the probability that a patient will be sent to
have a cesarean section. The contribution is threefold. First, it proposes an
innovative empirical approach that allows me to estimate physician’s responses
to exogenous shocks to effective staffing. Second, it provides suggestive evi-
dence that physicians do not choose at random which patients to over-treat,
but may instead exploit their bargaining power. Lastly, it brings to light yet
another cause for the high C-section rates we see today: low effective staffing.
Focusing exclusively on patients attempting labor and vaginal delivery, this
study finds that first-time mothers who -at admission- face a ratio of patients-
to-midwives higher than 1.3 are about 34% (or 4 p.p.) more likely to change
delivery method. There are two type of patients who are more affected by
36Back of the envelope calculations suggest that there are about 86 “extra” C-sections in
the 4 years in the sample due to crowding. According to the prices on acute interventions
published by the Italian Ministry of Health, a vaginal delivery without complication is rated
at e1,272, while a C-section costs e2,092. Hence the difference (e820time the number of
extra C-sections (107) divided by the number of years (4) gives e17,700.
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this. First, patients who upon admission have an already higher risk of C-
section are more likely to develop complications due to limited care when few
midwives are available. Secondly, single women, due to their lower bargaining
power. I provide evidence that physicians may decide to induce some patients
towards having a C-section in order to speed up the delivery and release the
pressure on midwives in the delivery room. In summary, the evidence provided
here suggests that physicians’ way to deal with an exogenous shock in demand
(patients) is to induce some patients towards an intervention that is faster,
maximizing the aggregate health in the maternity ward.
My estimates imply that the total number of C-sections for first-time mothers
could be reduced by about 5.7% (1.2 p.p.) if situations of low-staffing are
avoided. This would be a very important achievement given the already overly
high rates of C-sections observed in developed countries. Nevertheless, it is
not clear that public healthcare systems can quickly afford to tackle this issue.
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Chapter 2
Forgetting-by-not-doing: The
case of surgeons and cesarean
sections
2.1 Introduction
There is a large medical literature that documents an association between
higher hospital or surgeon procedure volume and lower mortality rates, for a
wide variety of different procedures, time periods, and locations (Luft et al.,
1979; Halm et al., 2002; Birkmeyer et al., 2002). The two main competing
hypothesis the literature offers for this correlation are the ‘learning-by-doing’
(or ‘practice-makes-perfect’) and the ‘selective referrals’ effects (Luft et al.,
1987). Under ‘learning-by-doing’, increased experience leads to improvement
in skills which in turn results in better outcomes. ‘Selective referral’, instead,
occurs when providers with higher quality attract greater demand and hence-
forth have a greater volume of patients. The importance of identifying which
one is driving the correlation between volume and outcome stems from the
fact that they have opposite policy implications. If volume causes outcome,
as learning-by-doing suggests, then the concentration of procedures in fewer
and bigger providers would bring better outcomes. However, if causality runs
from outcome to volume, then those benefits are not present anymore, and
concentration would only lead to reduced competition between providers.
This paper aims at causally identifying whether learning-by-doing is present at
the individual level in the healthcare sector, specifically for surgeons perform-
ing cesarean sections (C-sections). In particular, I look at whether surgeon’s
recent procedure volume (measured by the number of C-section surgeries per-
formed in the previous 30 days) affects performance (measure by patient out-
comes). In order to establish a causal relationship, I benefit from the fact that,
due to state regulation, pregnant women in Italy cannot choose the gynecol-
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ogist that will help them deliver their baby within the public system.1 This
institutional feature creates a scenario where selective referral is not possible.
I make use of a census of birth certificates from a large public hospital in Italy
for the period 2011-2014 that contains surgeon identifier for each operation.
To address possible concerns that physicians with more or less skills might
treat patients with a higher or lower risk (selective allocation), I use a fixed
effect model and rely on changes in volume within surgeon for the estimation.
I find strong evidence of learning-by-doing for C-section surgeons: performing
a single additional procedure in the previous 30 days lowers the newborn’s
probability of having a low Apgar score (below 9)2 and of being passed to
a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), both in a clinically meaningful and
statistically significant way. This effect is only present for emergent C-sections
(not for elective C-sections), meaning, cases in which the surgeon has to make
crucial decisions against the clock.
Cesarean sections are an attractive procedure to analyze the presence of sur-
geon’s ‘learning-by-doing’ hypothesis. Unlike other highly studied procedures
that are performed by a team of surgeons, C-sections are executed by only
one surgeon, allowing for better estimates of the individual surgeon’s learning
curve. In addition, for many developed countries, C-sections have become the
most common surgical procedure.3 Furthermore, a recent wave of closures of
maternity services in various countries (e.g. US, Canada, UK, Japan, France,
the Netherlands, and others)4 makes the discussion on volume-outcome effects
all the more relevant. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that
tries to obtain causal estimates of learning-by-doing for the case of cesarean
sections.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review
of the relevant literature, while Section 3 describes the clinical and institutional
setting. Section 4 discusses the identification strategy followed and describes
the data. Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In the recently published Encyclopedia of Health Economics, Vivian Ho states
that “...there are hundreds of papers in the medical literature finding an associ-
ation between higher hospital or surgeon procedure volume and lower mortality
1They can choose provider if they pay for it, but there are very few of these cases given
the high reputation of the public system.
2The Apgar score is a method used to quickly summarize the health of newborn children.
The Apgar scale is determined by evaluating the newborn baby on five simple criteria on a
scale from zero to two, then summing up the five values thus obtained. The resulting Apgar
score ranges from zero to 10.
3In the US, in 2011 there were almost 1.3 million C-sections while only 560,500 CABGs
(Pfuntner et al., 2013).
4Anecdotal evidence: Healthy Debate-Canada, Womens Enews-US, The Guardian-UK.
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rates. However, most rigorous econometric analyses of health care data have
been unable to formally identify learning by doing.”(Ho, 2014)
Studies on learning-by-doing have focused almost exclusively on two proce-
dures for heart disease -coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) and percuta-
neous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PCTA). They typically use lagged
or cumulative volume at hospital levels as the covariates of interest, and find
no support for the learning-by-doing hypothesis (Gaynor et al., 2005; Ho, 2002;
Sfekas, 2009). Instead, there is some evidence that the volume-outcome rela-
tionship is due to increasing returns to scale (Gaynor et al., 2005).5
The literature testing for volume-outcome effects using physician level data
is much more limited (Ho, 2014), and finds no clear consensus. On the one
hand, Huesch (2009) and Contreras et al. (2011) fail to find any association
between cumulative surgeon procedure volume and patient’s health. Huesch
(2009) looks at 57 “new cardiac surgeons”, a group where one would expect
learning effects to be the greatest. The author uses a model with physician
fixed effects and instruments volume with a choice model to mitigate potential
issues of selective referral -although he does not reject exogeneity of volume
for the physicians in the sample. In a different paper, Contreras et al. (2011)
use a longitudinal census for a specific eye surgery (LASIK) in one clinic in
Colombia. Their set up has three main advantages: (i) LASIK surgeries have
precise measures of presurgical condition and postsurgical outcomes (eyesight);
(ii) it is free of selective referral, since most patients are randomly assigned
to doctors in order to equalize workload; and (iii) unlike many surgeries (e.g.
CABG, PCTA), LASIK surgery is performed by one surgeon, and therefore
suitable for capturing surgeon’s individual learning curve. They use a model
with surgeon fixed effects and use individual cumulative surgeries to test for
learning.
On the other hand, Ramanarayanan (2008) and Huckman and Pisano (2006)
find evidence of strong learning-by-doing effects at the physician level when
using a measure of recent experience as their covariate of interest. This type of
volume-outcome relationship has been called learning-from-recent-experience
by Huesch and Sakakibara (2009). Ramanarayanan (2008) uses a longitudinal
dataset on CABGs that took place in Florida in the period 1998-2006, and
found that individual physician volume does have an effect on patient out-
comes. To alleviate issues of endogeneity, the author uses the departure of
a surgeon as an exogenous shock on the volume of the remaining physicians.
Instead, Huckman and Pisano (2006) do not discuss potential bias to a great
extent, and they confine themselves to using surgeon and hospital risk-adjusted
mortality as quality controls. They also focus on CABG cases -although their
data comes from Pennsylvania for 1994 and 1995- and find that the mortality
rate of patients decreases significantly with increases in the surgeon’s experi-
ence in the previous calendar quarter. Both these papers find that the effect of
experience is mainly driven by hospital specific experience, and is only partially
5See Huesch and Sakakibara (2009) for a schematic revision of the literature on the
volume-outcome relationship and possible mechanisms behind it.
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(if at all) portable across hospitals.
The main strength of this paper lies with the absence of selective referral
in the data. Although previous studies on CABG have gone a great length
to find exogenous instruments to mitigate this issue, identification becomes
considerably cleaner and straightforward in a context where selective referral
is simply not possible. The one study using data with the same feature is
Contreras et al. (2011). However, the present paper still holds the comparative
advantage of looking at a procedure that is far more common than the eye
surgery operation they focus on.
2.3 Background
2.3.1 The performance and organization of cesarean sec-
tions
A Cesarean section (C-section) is a major surgical procedure in which a fetus is
delivered through an incision in the mother’s abdomen and uterus (American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 2010). The procedure typically
takes 45 minutes to an hour, and most mothers and babies stay in the hospital
for two to three days. C-sections are now the most common surgery in several
developed nations, making them the focus of many policy discussions.67
Based on their urgency degree, C-sections can be classified in three groups:
elective, in-labor (or emergent) and urgent.8 The first group includes all sched-
uled C-sections, in which physician and mother have agreed in advance to not
have a vaginal delivery -in general on the basis of an obstetrical or medical
indication- but there is no maternal or fetal compromise. In-labor C-sections
occur when, a patient who is already experiencing labor and attempting to
have a vaginal delivery, develops some complications that put in danger the
health of the infant and/or the mother and thus the physician recommends to
change delivery method towards surgery. Finally, in urgent C-sections there is
some maternal or fetal compromise which is not immediately life-threatening.
6In US hospitals, “...Cesarean section was the most common major operating room pro-
cedure performed in 2011 [...] and the hospitalization rate for stays with Cesarean section
increased 39 percent since 1997.” (Pfuntner et al., 2013).
7“ Caesars legions”, The Economist, August 2015.
8This classification is very close to the one proposed by Lucas et al. (2000), which en-
compasses 4 categories because it differentiates between scheduled and elective C-sections.
Lucas’ is the only classification accepted officially by the Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists and the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence.
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2.3.2 The Italian health care system and C-sections
Italian health care is a universal, public-private insurance system. The public
part is the national health service- Sistema Sanitario Nazionale (SSN)-, which
is administered on a regional basis. According to the World Health Organi-
zation, the Italian system provides the second best overall health care in the
world -the first one being France.(Organization, 2000)
Under this system, a pregnant woman cannot choose the physician that will
follow her and delivery her baby, unless they pay. Furthermore, given the
well functioning of the system, the grand majority of people choose to use the
public service and do not choose.9 This institutional feature limits the risk of
selective referral, where institutions or surgeons with better performance will
attract higher volumes of patients -a common endogeneity issue in studies of
learning-by-doing.
The data used in this study comes from the Maternity Department of the
Azienda Ospedaliero Universitaria Careggi (AOUC), a public-teaching hospi-
tal located in Florence (Italy). In this hospital patients are assigned to the
physician in shift at the time of admission. However, more complex cases are
handled by the most experienced person in that field -selective allocation-,
which may bias my estimates towards zero. In order to mitigate these con-
cerns, I perform several robustness checks that are described in the following
section.
2.4 Empirical methodology
2.4.1 Empirical model
The main question addressed in this paper is whether there is learning-by-doing
in cesarean section surgeons. I test this by looking at whether surgeon’s recent
experience (est) has an impact on next surgery’s outcome. Thus I estimate a
reduced-form model of the following type:
yist = α + β est + δ dst + x
′
it θ + φt + ηs + ist (2.1)
where yist is a health indicator for patient i whose procedure was performed
by surgeon s at time t. Surgeon’s recent experience is defined as the number of
C-sections performed in the 30 days leading up to and including the procedure
on the patient surgeon s operated on just before operating on patient i. d
is a control for the number of days since the prior cesarean section surgeon
9For the data in hand, I can observe which patients have paid, and they constitute a few
dozen cases that are dropped from the study sample.
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s performed.10 xit contains individual-level control variables for mother and
pregnancy characteristics.11 Time fixed effects φ include year, month and day
of the week.
Individual surgeon fixed effects (ηs) are included to mitigate concerns that the
captured relationship between outcomes and recent experience is driven by
composition effects. For example, high quality surgeons may choose to operate
fewer patients but with higher risk of developing complications. Surgeon fixed
effects ensures that the recent experience parameter in 2.1 is identified from
changes in volume within surgeon. As discussed above, if physicians skills
improve with repetition, then β should be negative: since outcomes are defined
as adverse, a higher recent volume of surgeries would help (partially) avoid the
lose of skills. On the contrary, a coefficient close to zero would imply that there
is full depreciation and recent experience does not affect current outcome.
2.4.2 Robustness checks
Even if physician fixed effects help alleviate issues of selection of patients based
on physician’s skills, there could still be problems of endogeneity if there exist
some sort of dynamic matching. For instance, a physician aware of depreciating
skills may handpick healthier patients to operate on after a period of low
activity, and my estimates on the impact of recent experience on patients’
health would suffer from a downward bias.12 To mitigate this concerns, I
perform a series of robustness checks following Hockenberry and Helmchen
(2014).
First, I estimate a separate coefficient for different types of C-sections, de-
pending on their emergency status. Since in-labor C-sections are classified as
emergent cases, where patients needing to be taken care of as soon as possi-
ble, there is little room for patient selection. Moreover, given the unexpected
nature of these cases, surgeons need to make fast decisions under pressure and
skill depreciation should be of particular relevance. These patients are already
in labor, which adds one additional layer of complication: one important fac-
tor for the success of these surgeries is the timing of the cut in relation to the
contractions.
In a second robustness check, I use a restricted sample with surgeons perform-
ing a minimum of 20 C-sections per year. This will help mitigate the possibility
10This measure is more precise than fixed calendar months as it responds instantaneously
to any changes in the recent experience profile.
11These include: a quadratic term for mother’s age, a dummy for whether the mother has
a university degree, a dummy for whether this is her first pregnancy, a dummy for whether
the infant is a male, a dummy for whether is a pre-term birth (below 37 weeks of gestation),
a dummy for whether the baby is born with low weight (less than 2,500 grams), and a
dummy for whether the mother had at least one emergency check up during pregnancy.
12The opposite case, were less active surgeons choose patients with worse health, is less
likely to occur. Under this scenario, my estimates would be an upper bound of the true
effect.
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that my estimates of the effect of recent experience on outcomes are capturing
some systematic unobservable quality differences between high and low volume
surgeons and patients’ health.
Finally, I test whether recent experience is correlated with pre-treatment char-
acteristics that might be associated with patient’s health.
2.4.3 Data
This study utilizes birth certificates13 from the Maternity Department of the
Azienda Ospedaliero Universitaria Careggi (AOUC) for the years 2011 through
2014. This is the biggest hospital in the Province of Florence with more than
3,000 deliveries per year. Birth certificates constitute a census of all births
that took place in the hospital in this period. It contains information on
mother characteristics (e.g. community of residence, education, civil status,
age, previous deliveries, etc.), pregnancy characteristics (e.g. weeks of ges-
tation, controls, assisted reproduction, etc.), birth characteristics (e.g. time
of birth, type of labour, attendant, place, etc.) and indicators on newborns’
health (e.g. weight, height, apgar score, death, etc.). This information is
complemented with surgeon’s ID.14
The richness of this dataset comes at a cost: because the information avail-
able corresponds to just one hospital in a four year period, the sample size is
relatively small. There were approximately 12,343 newborns during the pe-
riod under study, from which 4,413 (35%) are C-sections -the rest are vaginal
deliveries-. Almost half of these C-sections are planned in advance between the
physician and the patient (elective C-sections). The remaining half is more or
less equally constituted by in-labour C-sections -pregnancies that attempted
to deliver vaginally but later changed to C-section because of some anomaly
found during labour- and urgent C-sections -in which no labour was tried.
From the 4,413 cases, I dropped from the analysis 115 of births that had
missing information in at least one of the variables used. In addition, I keep
only one observation per pregnancy and drop 396 observations from plural
births. Then I restrict the sample to surgeons who have performed at least 6
C-sections a year, keeping 55 surgeons who performed 3,623 (92%) surgeries.15
13Certificato di assistenza al parto (CEDAP).
14The data in hand encompasses only births, hence I am blind to any other activities
gynecologists may perform when not doing C-sections. Other surgeries include removal
of the uterus, tubes and ovaries in the case of tumors, removal of ovarian cysts, removal
of uterine fibroids, removal of “pathologic” tissue in endometriosis, treatment of ectopic
pregnancies (ie, where the fetus develops out from the uterus), and more. Hockenberry
and Helmchen (2014) utilize two measures of temporal break, time since the last CABG
performed and time since any surgical procedure, and find that the last one affects patient
outcomes substantially more than the procedure-specific measure. If that were the case also
for surgeons performing C-sections, the estimates reported below would be biased towards
zero and constitute a lower bound of the true effect.
15Initially there were 85 surgeons in the sample, but many of those performed few and
sporadic surgeries and were not registered again in my data.
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Finally I drop the cases in which the number of days between a surgeon’s last
C-section and the current one is above 30 days (751 cases) because there may
be other factors affecting their recent experience (e.g. surgeons who are just
starting, sickness or paternal leave, etc). The study sample has 3,013 births
performed by 55 surgeons in the 4 years.
Table 2.1 summarizes the variables used in the analysis for this sample. Mean
admission to NICU was 21.3%16, mean low Apgar score was 12.1%, and mean
postoperative length of stay was 92.2 hours. For surgeons performing at least
20 C-sections a year, mean admission to NICU was 24.4%, mean low Apgar
score was 13.8%, and mean postoperative length of stay was 92.8 hours, con-
sistent with the hypothesis that high-volume surgeons take high-risk cases.
Emergently admitted patients (in-labor C-sections) had higher probability of
having a low Apgar score, but less likely to be admitted to NICU than elective
patients; on the other hand, urgent cases have a higher probability of both bad
outcomes.
The mean number of procedures performed in the previous 30 days was 3 for all
surgeons, and 3.6 for high-volume surgeons. Surgeons performing emergent or
urgent C-sections have a higher mean recent experience than those performing
elective procedures. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the measure of recent
experience for the whole sample.
Figure 2.1 – Distribution of cesarean sections by surgeon’s recent experience.
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The average age of patients is 34.5, and about 41% of them are first-time
mothers -although this number is only 31% for elective procedures, and higher
for the others. Similarly, about 20% of all births are born with less than 37
weeks of gestation, but they constitute 32% of urgent C-sections, and only
12.6% of emergent C-sections.
16This includes both intensive and sub-intensive units.
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2.4.4 Outcomes
The most common outcome (almost exclusively) used in the health economics
literature analyzing learning-by-doing and forgetting by hospitals and physi-
cians is the death of the patient -both during and after surgery. As mentioned
before, one important drawback of the database used here is the small sample
size. Both maternal and fetal deaths are rare events, more so in developed
countries, hence there are very few observations experiencing either one of
these outcomes (e.g. there are only 12 stillbirths in the study sample). This
impedes their use as outcomes for this study. However, one may also argue
that mortality alone, being an extreme outcome, is an inadequate measure
for capturing the full spectrum of the effects of learning-by-doing on patient
health and hospital costs (e.g. morbidity or ordered procedures may also be
important outcomes).
The data in hand contains other potential outcomes for patients’ health beyond
death that can be affected by surgeons skills. As proxies for newborns’ health,
this study uses the probability of needing to be transferred to a neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU) and probability of having a low APGAR score. The
first one measures whether the newborn had to be transferred to an NICU. The
idea here is that with two equally healthy pregnancies, if one ends up going to
NICU and the other doesn’t, then something was done wrong -or not that well-
in the first case. Furthermore, NICU admissions are among the most expensive
treatments in regular hospitals, with one day cost being above $3,000. The
second outcome is based on a total score of 1 to 10, the higher the score, the
better the baby is doing after birth. This test is done to determine whether
a newborn needs help breathing or is having heart trouble. Any score lower
than 7 is a sign that the baby needs medical attention. In this study, there
are only 72 newborns with score below 7. For this reason a new measure was
constructed setting the bar higher and all births with a score lower than 9 will
be considered of lower health. This doesn’t necessarily mean a bad score that
doctors should act on, but it can be argue that a newborn with an APGAR
score below 9 is in worse health condition than a newborn with a score of 9
or 10. With regard to mothers’ health, the only outcome available that can
be affected by surgeons skills is the postoperative length of stay in hospital
(PLOS), measured in number of days.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 The effect of recent practice on patient health
Table 2.2 presents the average marginal effects of recent experience in a linear
probability model.1718 Panel (A) shows coefficients for experience when pulling
together all C-sections, while Panel (B) shows coefficients by type of C-section.
The first three columns are estimated using all physicians, while the last three
use only those performing at least 20 C-sections a year (high volume surgeons).
Table 2.2 – Average marginal effect of experience on outcomes
Surgeons performing at Surgeons performing at
least 6 C-sections a year least 20 C-sections a year
NICU§ Apgar<9 PLOS NICU§ Apgar<9 PLOS
Panel A:
All -0.005 -0.005 0.002 -0.009** -0.009** 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel B:
Elective 0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.004 -0.003 0.008
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
In-labor -0.012** -0.011** -0.002 -0.012* -0.014** 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Urgent -0.008 -0.003 -0.000 -0.010 -0.009 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Obs. 3,013 3,013 2,884 1,614 1,614 1,532
Mean Dep. 0.213 0.121 4.462 0.220 0.110 4.510
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Reported coefficients are average marginal effects. Panel (A) presents coefficients
for experience when using the full sample, and Panel (B) are by type of C-section.
§NICU: Neonatal Intensive Care Unit; PLOS: Postoperative length of stay (in
log-hours). All models include controls for year, month and day of the week fixed
effects, surgeon fixed effects and controls for emergency visits during pregnancy,
low weight-at-birth, a quadratic term for weeks-of-gestation, newborn’s gender, a
quadratic term for mother’s age, mother’s education and whether she is first-time
mother.
If one were to focus only on the full sample of C-sections and physicians,
reported coefficients suggest that there is very small and insignificant effects
17Table B.2 compares results using a probit or a linear probability model and coefficients
are virtually the same up to the second decimal.
18In Appendix B.1 I provide a more detailed discussion on model selection, where models
of different polynomial degrees and categorical definitions of recent-experience are tested. A
linear specification seems to be the one that better fits the data.
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of recent experience on outcomes, or in other words, very little surgeon’s skills
depreciation. However, for patients whose whose C-section was done by a
high-volume surgeon (Panel A, last three columns), an additional C-section in
the previous 30 days was associated with a decrease in the likelihood of both
NICU admission and low Apgar-Score by nearly 1 percentage point (or 3.7%
and 6.5% relative to the sample means). Similar to results on the full-sample
of surgeons, an additional C-section in the past 30 days has no statistically
nor economically significant effect on the postoperative length of stay.
The estimated impact of recent experience on outcomes was even larger when
looking at emergent cases. For physicians performing an in-labour C-section,
having performed one additional C-section in the previous 30 days was as-
sociated with a decrease in neonatal intensive care unit admission by nearly
1.2 percentage points (or 5.5% relative to the sample mean) and a decrease
in low Apgar Score of about 1.1 percentage points (or 10% relative to the
sample mean). The effect was smaller in magnitude and not statistically sig-
nificant for the case or urgent or elective C-sections. Once again, the effects
on postoperative length of stay were very precisely estimated close to zero for
all three types of surgeries. Surprisingly, unlike the before when looking at all
C-sections together, results for high-volume surgeons by type of C-sections are
quite similar to those for the whole sample of surgeons.
2.5.2 Robustness checks
A priori, there is no clear criteria to choose a specific time period for my
measure of recent experience. If one were to choose a very long period, it
could happen that the effect of the further away surgeries have little impact
on today’s one. On the other hand, choose a period too short and maybe there
is not enough variation in the amount of experience. In this paper I decided
to measure recent experience within the last 4 weeks (30 days). To test how
sensitive results are to this decision, I run a set of regression for different time
spams (from 2 weeks up to 32 weeks) for the three outcomes. Figure 2.2 shows
the results for the case of (emergent) in-labor C-sections using the full sample
of surgeons. For both NICU admission and low Apgar Score, the effect of
the number of previous C-sections gets monotonically smaller the longer is the
measurement period (except when using a time period of two, although here
the standard errors are considerably higher). This provides further evidence for
the human capital depreciation hypothesis, where procedures performed more
than one year back have little effect on surgeon’s ability today -controlling
for her average ability. Similar to previous findings, there is a consistent not
significant effect of recent experience on the mother’s postoperative length of
stay across time windows.
To test whether selection bias affects these results, I regress each pre-treatment
characteristic on the treatment -the number of C-sections performed in the last
30 days-. If observed characteristics were associated with recent experience,
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Figure 2.2 – Average marginal effect of recent experience measured in different
time windows.
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it would be a sign of patient selection. The results for these estimations are
reported in Table B.3. All coefficients are small in absolute and relative size,
and all but one are not statistically different from zero. The only case that
it is significant at the 90% level is for having had an emergency visit during
pregnancy, but the point estimate implies only a 4.5% change.
2.6 Discussion
There is a well established positive association in healthcare between providers’
volume and health outcomes, yet our current understanding on the drivers be-
hind this correlation are limited. The two leading explanatory mechanisms are
‘learning-by-doing’ and ‘selective referral’. In this paper I use a unique feature
of the Italian health care system -patients are not allowed to choose physician-
to investigate whether there is evidence of ‘learning-by-doing’ in cesarean sec-
tion surgeons. More specifically, I test whether surgeons who have performed
more procedures in the recent past observe an improvement in performance.
The contribution is threefold: First it my empirical approach rests on an in-
stitutional context that allows me to estimate parameters that are free of the
self-selection bias that may arise when patients can sort across physicians. Sec-
ond, I provide some evidence that learning-by-doing effects are heterogeneous
across procedure types depending on their emergent nature. Finally, I inves-
tigate this for C-sections, a procedure that is nowadays very relevant but has
been ignored so far in the literature of learning-by-doing.
Using information on birth certificates for one large hospital in Italy during be-
tween 2011 and 2014, I find that, for emergent cases, performing one additional
procedure reduces the likelihood of neonatal intensive care unit admission by
nearly 1.2 percentage points (5.5%) and of being born with a low Apgar Score
by about 1.1 percentage points (10%), all else equal. This effect is not present
for the case of elective C-sections.
In terms of policy recommendation, the results of this study would add to the
benefits of centralizing cesarean section services in a small number of bigger
maternity wards. The evidence here suggests that physicians who perform
more C-sections in the recent past are better when executing the next surgery,
specially in the cases where it is an emergency C-section.
Gabriel Alejandro Facchini Palma 43
Essays in Health Economics
44 Gabriel Alejandro Facchini Palma
Appendix A
A.1 The working sample and scheduled pa-
tients
The working sample used in the main paper is restricted to only those un-
scheduled patients who attempt to have a vaginal delivery after going through
labor and leaves out scheduled patients. Scheduled patients can be further di-
vided in two groups: (i) elective C-sections, and (ii) pharmacologically-induced
patients. This appendix shows evidence of how the latter group’s transition
through the maternity ward resembles more that of elective C-section rather
than the one of unscheduled patients, and hence should not be included in the
working sample.
One important caveat of the data is that one cannot disentangle scheduled
from unscheduled patients among those who were pharmacologically induced.
However, anecdotal evidence from the ward’s staff suggest that most of them
are scheduled (e.g. overdue pregnancy). Furthermore, a descriptive analysis
of the data seems to corroborate that. Figures A.1 and A.2 present the distri-
bution of patients across hours and days as performed in section 1.3.1 of the
main paper except that now scheduled patients are further divided between
elective C-sections and induced. Starting from Figure A.1, it shows that there
is a pick in admissions for both elective C-sections and induced patients during
the afternoon shift, and then again a pick in time of birth (although the pick is
later in the day for induced patients relative to the elective C-sections). Nev-
ertheless, the picks are less pronounced for induced patients, suggesting that
some of them may be arriving at random hours of the day like unscheduled
patients do.
Even though the distribution by hours of induced patients seem to follow that
of elective C-sections, their distribution by day of the week instead is closer
to that of unscheduled patients. Even though admissions are slightly lower
during weekends, births are evenly distributed across all days of the week.
This is probably due to the fact that, as long as everything goes well, these
patients are taken care of by midwives (not physicians).
The evidence provided in this appendix supports the idea of excluding both
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elective C-sections and pharmacologically induced patients from the working
sample, but to include the latter group in the treatment variable given that
they are primordially seen by midwives.
Figure A.1 – Distribution of admissions and births by hour.
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Figure A.2 – Frequency of admissions and births by day.
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A.2 A measure of workload without adjusting
for supply side factors
The measure of workload used in the main paper is the ratio of patients-to-
midwives, hence it takes into account both demand and supply side effects.
Specifying the covariate of interest as a ratio may put some constraints on the
estimated coefficient. This appendix repeats the main estimations but using
instead the number of unscheduled patients waiting to give birth (without
adjusting for the number of midwives).
Figures A.3 shows a histogram of the number of unscheduled patients observed
by each patient at admission. The mode is 3, and the mean is slightly above
at 3.34. As in the main paper, I divide this variable in quintiles to test for
non-linearities in its effect on the probability of C-section. Table A.1 describes
the number of observations and limits for each quintile.
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Figure A.3 – Histogram unsched-
uled patients
Quintile N Min Max
1 953 0 2
2 536 3 3
3 466 4 4
4 320 5 5
5 338 6 13
Table A.1 – Descriptive statistics of
quintiles
Finally Table A.2 presents the results from running the preferred model using
the number of unscheduled patients as regressor. Similar to the findings in the
main paper, there seems to be a non-linear relationship between workload and
the probability of C-section. This effect starts to rise already in the second
quintile and slowly declines in the fourth and fifth quintiles. This provides
more assurance to the results using the ratio of patients-to-midwives.
A.3 Robustness to alternative models
In the main paper two functional forms are tested for the effect of workload
on the probability of C-section: a linear specification, and a non-linear one
using a categorical variable constructed from the 20th and 80th percentiles.
This appendix elaborates further on the model selection and tests other speci-
fications. Columns (1) to (4) in Table A.3 present the coefficients for different
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Table A.2 – Average marginal effect on probability of C-section
Linear Non-linear
Number of unscheduled 0.0044
patients (0.0036)
2nd Quintile 0.0309*
(0.0177)
3rd Quintile 0.0503**
(0.0200)
4th Quintile 0.0384*
(0.0223)
5th Quintile 0.0266
(0.0212)
Observations 2,613 2,613
Mean dep. 0.119 0.119
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p <
0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
polynomial degrees of the ratio of patients-to-midwives, with the Akaike In-
formation Criteria (AIC) reported at the bottom. It seems that, within these
polynomial functional forms, the data at hand is better represented by either
a squared or cubic polynomial, given their statistical significance and their low
AIC.
Column five presents results using a categorical variable with the quintiles
of the distribution of the ratio of patients-to-midwives (where the reference
group is the first quintile). This specification gives the model more flexibility
to fit the data, at the cost of estimating more coefficients. Results suggest
that there is a sudden rise in the probability of C-section for patients who
see a ratio of patients-to-midwives in the second quintile, which then falls
slowly until the fifth quintile where it is no longer statistically distinguishable
from the reference group. This decay in the probability of C-section for higher
workloads may be associated with capacity constraints on the operative theater
(beds, number of gynecologists, etc.).
Given the previous , I created a variable with three categories where the 3 mid-
dle quintiles of the ratio of patients-to-midwives have been coded together in
one group (<20th percentile, 20-80th percentile, >80th percentile). This spec-
ification has the advantage of capturing the higher level of C-sections that oc-
curs in the middle of the workload distribution, while diminishing the number
of coefficients to be estimated and augmenting precision. Results are presented
in the sixth column.
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Table A.3 – Alternative model specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ratio 0.0004 0.0524** 0.1195** 0.1627
(0.0085) (0.0240) (0.0535) (0.1283)
Ratio Square -0.0104** -0.0369** -0.0633
(0.0044) (0.0182) (0.0719)
Ratio Cubic 0.0030* 0.0091
(0.0018) (0.0157)
Ratio Quadratic -0.0005
(0.0011)
2nd Quintile 0.0554***
(0.0199)
3rd Quintile 0.0329*
(0.0196)
4th Quintile 0.0299
(0.0211)
5th Quintile 0.0167
(0.0216)
20-80th Percentile 0.0408***
(0.0156)
>80th Percentile 0.0197
(0.0213)
Observations 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613
AIC 1544.59 1542.58 1543.18 1545.06 1541.89 1539.65
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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A.4 Other Graphs and Tables
Figure A.4 – Density distribution of Ratio
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Figure A.5 – Ratio by time of admission
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Table A.4 – Regression of pre-treatment characteristics on Ratio of patients-
to-midwives
Dependent variable Coef. of Ratio
Mother’s characteristics
With university degree -0.0141
(0.0129)
Above 36 yo -0.0033
(0.0117)
Pregnancy’s characteristics
Preterm (before 37th week) -0.0080
(0.0057)
At least 1 ER visit -0.0005
(0.0076)
Newborn’s characteristics
Male -0.0045
(0.0132)
Low weight at birth -0.0054
(0.0055)
Observations 2,613
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p <
0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table A.6 – Probability of C-section using a Linear Probability and Probit
Model
LPM Probit
Panel (A):
Ratio patients 0.0007 0.0012
to midwives (0.0083) (0.0081)
Panel (B):
20-80th Percentile 0.0410*** 0.0437***
(0.0154) (0.0166)
>80th Percentile 0.0187 0.0222
(0.0210) (0.0221)
Observations 2,613 2,613
Mean dep. 0.119 0.119
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table A.9 – Effect of staffing at admission and 24hs after
Workload at admission Workload 24hs after admission
Panel (A)
Ratio patients 0.0019 0.0004 0.0020 -0.0010
to midwives (0.0074) (0.0085) (0.0073) (0.0081)
Panel (B)
20-80th Percentile 0.0432*** 0.0408*** -0.0019 -0.0065
(0.0149) (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0161)
>80th Percentile 0.0193 0.0197 0.0011 -0.0091
(0.0196) (0.0213) (0.0202) (0.0213)
Time FE X X X X
Controls X X
Other patients X X
Shift*DOW FE X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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B.1 Robustness to alternative models
Because there might be non-linearities in the effect of recent-experience on
health outcomes, this appendix repeats the main estimation for different spec-
ifications of the covariate of interest. The analysis is performed only on the
sample of high-volume surgeons. Columns (1) to (3) in Table B.1 present the
coefficients including different polynomial degrees of recent-experience, and
column (4) divides the distribution in three using percentiles (below 33th per-
centile, between 33-66th percentiles, and above 66th percentile). At the bottom
of the table I report the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). The same exercise
is repeated for the three outcomes analyzed in the paper.
For all cases, a linear specification seems to be the one that better fits the
data, although when looking at the probability of NICU admission there is
some evidence that the effect is significant only for very high values of recent-
experience.
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B.2 Other graphs and tables
Table B.2 – Linear Probability vs. Probit Model
Probit LPM
NICU§ Apgar<9 NICU§ Apgar<9
Experience -0.006* -0.006* -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Obs. 3,013 2,947 3,013 3,013
Mean Dep. 0.213 0.124 0.213 0.121
§NICU: Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p <
0.1. Reported coefficients are average marginal effects. All
models include controls for year, month and day of the
week fixed effects, surgeon fixed effects and controls for
emergency visits during pregnancy, low weight-at-birth, a
quadratic term for weeks-of-gestation, newborn’s gender,
a quadratic term for mother’s age, mother’s education and
whether she is first-time mother.
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